

**Housing and Property Chamber
First-tier Tribunal for Scotland**



Decision on homeowner's application:

Property Factors (Scotland) Act 2011 Section 19(1)(a)

Of

the Housing and Property Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland

(Hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal")

Case references : FTS/HPC/PF/18/2090

Re: Properties at –

**83 & 109 Greenrigg Road, Cumbernauld, G67 2QD
("the Properties")**

The Parties :

**Edward Muldoon, 83 & 109 Greenrigg Road, Cumbernauld, G67 2QD
("Applicant")**

(represented by Working Legally Ltd, 2/2, 11 Western Avenue, Rutherglen, South Lanarkshire G73 1LQ)

**Apex Property Factor Ltd, 46 Eastside, Kirkintilloch, East Dunbartonshire
G66 1QH ("Respondents")**

Tribunal Members:-

David Bartos - Chairperson, Legal member
Sara Hesp - Ordinary (Surveyor) member

DECISION

1. The Tribunal having no jurisdiction to deal with the Applicant's complaints of the Respondents' failure to comply with section 14(5) of the Property Factors (Scotland) Act 2011 or failure to carry out property factor's duties as defined in section 17(5) of that Act, dismisses the application.

Introduction

2. In this decision the Property Factors (Scotland) Act 2011 is referred to as "the 2011 Act"; the Property Factors (Scotland) Act 2011 Code of Conduct for Property Factors is referred to as "the Code"; and the rules in schedule 1 to the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland Housing and Property Chamber (Procedure) Regulations 2017 are referred to as "the Rules".
3. On 15 August 2018, an application was received by the Housing and Property Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal for Scotland ("the Tribunal") from the Applicant's representative seeking a decision that the Respondents had failed to comply with the Property Factor Code of Conduct and other property factor's duties. The application alleged breaches of sections 1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 3.3, 4.9, 6.3, 6.4, and 7 of the Code. It also alleged that the Respondents had breached their duties:
 - (1) In not carrying out grass cutting;
 - (2) In not cleaning internal common hallways and stairs;
 - (3) In not carrying out repairs to stairs, hallways and the roof.Unfortunately the Applicant had died before the receipt of his application.

Findings of Fact

4. Having considered all the evidence, the Tribunal found the following facts to be established:-
 - (a) The two Properties are flats within the development of 75 flats numbered 1 to 135 Greenrigg Road, Cumbernauld. The 75 flats are

in a row of 8 blocks (numbered blocks 1 to 8). The Properties include common parts of the development. The development is from the 1980s.

- (b) The development is situated on the south-east side of Greenrigg Road at the west of the neighbouring development. That neighbouring development consists of a row of 7 blocks of flats numbered 137 to 259 Greenrigg Road.
- (c) The Properties are owned by EML Properties (Scot) Limited company number SC299096 in terms of title numbers DMB23932 and DMB21049.
- (d) The Respondents became a registered property factor in terms of the Property Factors (Scotland) Act 2011 on 1 November 2012.
- (e) The flats within the development are all subject to a deed of conditions recorded in the General Register of Sasines on 2 July 1986 ("the Deed of Conditions").
- (f) At the beginning of 2015 there were no factors in place for the development. Since August 2015 the Respondents have purported to act as factors for the development. There has been no meeting of the homeowners in the development appointing the Respondents as factors for the development. There has been no vote of a majority of the homeowners in the development appointing the Respondents as factors. No factoring contract or agreement has been entered into between the homeowners of the development and the Respondents.
- (g) In about September 2016 the Respondents issued a "Property Factoring Statement of Service" to homeowners in the development.
- (h) In August and September 2017 the Respondents did not carry out cleaning works and maintenance of the common parts of the development including the verges of the access road and car park, the outside stairs of the development and the internal stairwell of the block comprising numbers 21 to 35 Greenrigg Road.

- (i) On or about 28 September 2017 the Respondents issued invoices to homeowners in the development seeking payment for cleaning, landscaping and litter-picking services allegedly carried out in August 2017.
- (j) By letter dated 4 July 2018 Working Legal wrote to the Respondents on behalf of certain owners of properties at numbers 7, 13, 27, 29, 83, 85c, 99, 101, 109, 125 and 131 Greenrigg Road in the development complaining of breaches of sections 1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 3.3, 4.9, 6.3, 6.4 and 7 of the Code.
- (k) By letter to Working Legal dated 27 July 2018 the Respondents rejected the claimed breaches of the Code.
- (l) Applications to the Tribunal purporting to be on behalf of the Applicant and the owners of 7, 13, 27, 29, 85c, 99, 101, 125 and 131 Greenrigg Road were lodged on 15 August 2018.

Procedure

- 5. The application to the Tribunal sought in the first place an order declaring that the Respondents were not as a matter of law factors for the development. It also sought a determination of failure to comply with the Code and also with other property factor's duties. On or about 27 September 2018 a Convener with delegated power of the President of the Tribunal referred the application to the present Tribunal for its determination. This was notified to the parties by letters from the Tribunal's casework officer dated 17 October 2018 which also invited the parties to make written representations to the Tribunal and to lodge supporting documents known as productions.
- 6. The Applicant's representatives lodged productions with the Tribunal on 6 September, 6 November, 20 December all 2018, and on 10 January 2019. The Respondents lodged productions with the Tribunal on 18 December 2018 and on 3 January 2019 but the latter of these were

lodged late and not relied on by the Respondents. The Applicant's representatives lodged written representations comprising (1) a skeleton argument; (2) a letter dated 29 November 2018 in response to the Tribunal's direction dated 20 November 2018; and (3) a letter dated 8 December 2018 in response to the Tribunal's direction dated 5 December 2018. The Respondents lodged written representations on 7 November 2018 and on 18 December 2018 (in a letter dated 14 December).

7. A hearing was fixed to take place at the Glasgow Tribunals Centre, 20 York Street, Glasgow G2 8GT on 4 January 2019 at 10.00 a.m. The date and times were intimated to the Applicants and the Respondents by letters from the Tribunal's casework officer dated 22 November 2018.
8. The hearing took place on 4 January 2019 at 10 a.m. at the venue fixed for it. Mr James Collier of Working Legally purported to appear for the Applicant. Mr Neil Cowan appeared for the Respondents. The hearing was continued to the same venue and time on 11 February 2019 when it concluded.

Jurisdiction - Summary

9. Three matters arose at the outset. All three had the potential of excluding the jurisdiction (power) of the Tribunal to make the order sought in the application. In other words if any of them excluded the jurisdiction of the Tribunal it could not consider the breaches of Code and property factor's duties alleged.
10. The first matter was, as Mr Collier accepted, that the Applicant had died before the making of the application. The second matter was that the Applicant was not the owner of the Properties. Rather they were owned by a company of which the Applicant's daughter Linda Cannon was a

shareholder. The third matter was that even if the company had been the applicant, there did not appear to be any factoring contract in place between it and the Respondents. In that case it might be difficult to see how the Respondents could owe any duty to the company whether under the Code or as (another) property factor's duty.

Jurisdiction – Predecease of Applicant

11. The Tribunal can only consider applications from either live individuals or existing legal persons such as companies. In this instance the application was made on behalf of a person who had died before it had been lodged. In these circumstances it was legally incompetent from the outset and fell to be rejected.

12. The Tribunal observed that another effect of the Applicant's predecease was that Mr Collier's authorisation to lodge the application, and indeed to represent the Applicant had ceased.

Jurisdiction – Non-ownership of Property

13. The Tribunal can only consider applications from owners of land or buildings (heritable property). That is the effect of section 17(1) as read with section 10(5) of the 2011 Act. In this instance the owner of the Properties was a company who was not an applicant at any time during the application process. Even had he not died, the Applicant was not an owner of the Properties.

14. In these circumstances the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction (power) to deal with the application. For this reason also the application had to be rejected. Strictly speaking it was therefore not necessary to deal with the third matter. However given the importance of the third matter the Tribunal expressed its view on it.

Jurisdiction – Issue of Existence of Factoring Contract/Appointment

15. The key remedy sought in the application was an order declaring that the Respondents had not been appointed as property factor. In other words it sought a binding declaration from the Tribunal that the Respondents were not the agents for the homeowners in the development.
16. The jurisdiction (power) of the Tribunal is set out in sections 17(1) and 19(1) and (3) and 20 of the 2011 Act. Section 17(1) gives it power to decide, on the application by a homeowner, whether a property factor has failed (a) to carry out property factor's duties; or (b) to ensure compliance with the Code of Conduct. Section 19(1) gives it the power and section 19(3) the duty, to make a property factor enforcement order in the event that it finds any of those failures to have taken place. Section 20 specifies that such an order may require the factor to execute such action as the Tribunal considers necessary or to make payment which the Tribunal considers reasonable.
17. Property factors existed before the 2011 Act. As noted already a property factor is an agent of the owner or owners of property who manages the property on behalf of the owners. That relationship is one of contract in which the owners are the principals or clients of the factor who is their joint agent. Before the 2011 Act if there was no contract of agency with the homeowners there was no property factor. An example of this was in the case *Hanover (Scotland) Housing Association v. Reid* 2006 Scots Law Times 518 where it was found that there had been no valid appointment of the factor.
18. The aim of the 2011 Act was to provide a remedy to homeowners in respect of their property factors and to improve the service provided by

such factors. This was reflected in the Policy Memorandum supporting the Bill which became the Act, which stated in paragraph 16:

“This new form of alternative dispute resolution would enable a homeowner to apply in writing to the homeowner housing panel for a determination of whether *their* property factor had failed to comply with any term of the contract between the parties or with the statutory code of conduct.” (Tribunal’s emphasis).

That the Act was designed to deal with the relationship between homeowners and “their” accepted factors is emphasized further in paragraph 6 of the Policy Memorandum. In listing the mischiefs which the Act was to deal with, paragraph 6 refers to homeowners and “their” factors and nowhere mentions disputes over appointment of factors such as that in the *Reid* case.

19. The Code underlines the purposes of the Act in its provisions. Almost of all of these deal with the nature of an existing relationship between a factor and his clients. The principal provision of the Code is the requirement that the factor provides the homeowner with a written statement of services. Such services can only be provided (legitimately) as part of a contract between the factor and homeowners. Absent a valid appointment no services would be due and no written statement would be appropriate.
20. If there were no definitions of “homeowner” or “property factor” in the 2011 Act it would be plain that without a contract of agency between homeowner and factor there could be no “property factor’s duty” owed by the factor to the homeowner which could be adjudicated on by the tribunal under section 17(1)(a). Equally given that the Code of Conduct is intended to govern the conduct of a factor towards their client the homeowner, there could be no duty to comply with the Code of Conduct on which the tribunal could adjudicate under section 17(1)(b).

21. Do the definitions in the Act extend the jurisdiction of the tribunal under section 17(1) ? “Homeowner” is defined in section 10(5) of the Act. For that to be satisfied an owner must :
- (a) own land (or other immoveable property) the common parts of which are “managed” by a “property factor” or
 - (b) own residential property neighbouring the land managed by the factor which neighbouring (factored) land is available for the owner’s use.

All of that is entirely consistent with the requirement of a contract of agency between factor and owner. Nothing in section 10(5) appears designed to extend the jurisdiction to situations where there has been no contract between an owner and a person claiming to be the owner’s factor.

22. The expression “property factor” is itself defined in section 2(1). That definition while differing in its precise wording from section 10(5) essentially mirrors it. It too is consistent with the requirement for the existence of a contract between the owner and the person who falls within the definition in section 2(1). Again there is no suggestion that the Scottish Parliament intended the jurisdiction of the tribunal to cover situations where there was no contract between the parties to the dispute.
23. Leaving aside any case law it appears plain that the jurisdiction in section 17(1) assumes the existence of a contract of agency between the applicant homeowner and the respondent factor at the time of the alleged factor’s failure. On the basis of that assumption the only question for a tribunal will be whether during the duration of a factor/homeowner

contract there has been a breach of factor's duty or breach of the Code of Conduct.

24. It follows that the jurisdiction of the tribunal is not there to make a binding order on the issue of whether the contract of agency (factoring) does or does not exist. The jurisdiction to make such an order remains with the court. The words "property factor" in section 10(5) should be interpreted as meaning "property factor validly appointed on the owner's behalf" and in section 17(1) as "property factor validly appointed on the homeowner's behalf".
25. However there have been suggestions in previous cases that a tribunal can make an order against a person who may be registered as a factor even where the applicant and factor have never been party to a factoring contract. The principal case is *FTS/HPC/PF/17/0023*. At Upper Tribunal the case name *McNaught v. Apex Property Factor Limited* was used. The case is unreported. It involved the current Respondents. It involved a nearby development.
26. In *McNaught* the applicant complained of breaches by the Respondents of sections 2.2, 2.5, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 of the Code. He did not complain of breach of property factor's duties. The breaches alleged were all based on the Respondents not having been appointed factors and despite their lack of appointment having sent invoices to the applicant demanding payment and disregarding the applicant's requests for confirmation of their authority to act as factors.
27. The First-tier Tribunal found that the Respondents did not have the authority of the homeowners or their residents' association to act as factors. Nevertheless the tribunal went on to find that there had been breaches of sections 2.2, 2.5, 4.8 and 4.9 of the Code and proposed an

order requiring the Respondents to issue a credit note to the applicant for the illicit invoices.

28. The Respondents sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the basis that as the First-tier Tribunal had found that they had not been factors the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to propose the order requiring the credit note.

29. The Upper Tribunal refused permission to appeal. In its refusal of permission the Upper Tribunal judge referred to the definition of “homeowner” in section 10(5) of the Act, stating, in paragraph [6] :

“It is a necessary component of this definition that the homeowner’s property be managed by a property factor. The provision contains no express requirement that the property factor who carries out that management should be validly appointed; to imply that condition would not be consistent with the legislative intention of setting minimum standards of practice for all registered property factors (section 14(1)). All that is required is that the property factor who is the subject of the complaint did in fact manage or maintain common property pertinent to the homeowner’s property.”

The mention of legislative intention appeared to be a reference back to paragraph [4] of the refusal where the Upper Tribunal judge stated that the obligation to comply with the Code applied to a property factor whether validly appointed or not because,

“When the various breaches of the code identified [sections 2.2, 2.5, 4.8 and 4.9] are considered it is apparent that no other interpretation would make sense. . . These duties are all aimed at setting minimum standards of practice for registered property factors generally (section 14(1)).”

30. However the Upper Tribunal judge had not been given the information in the Policy Memorandum already noted. He was unaware of the assumption of the Scottish Parliament was that there would be a factor in place and that the tribunal (formerly committee) would decide disputes

between such factors (validly appointed) and “their” clients, the homeowners.

31. In addition, the Upper Tribunal judge had not taken account of the provisions of the Code as a whole and the key duty in section 1 of the Code, namely to provide a written statement of services with details of “arrangement in place” between homeowner and factor. It would be most odd if a registered factor who had not been validly appointed by homeowners should require to provide a statement of services. The supply of such a statement would be misleading for homeowners and potentially lead some of them thinking that the factor had been validly appointed when that was not the case. In turn it might lead to factors being forced onto homeowners against their will. None of that can have been the intention of the Scottish Parliament in the 2011 Act.
32. It would also be odd if some parts of the Code were applicable to validly appointed registered factors only and other parts of the Code (e.g. sections 2.2, 2.5, 4.8 and 4.9) to all registered factors whether validly appointed or not. There is no suggestion within the Code that it is to be applied in that manner.
33. In these circumstances it appeared to the Tribunal that the Upper Tribunal had erred in its refusal of permission to appeal in *McNaught*. No doubt this was due to full argument not having been put to the judge. The decision of the Upper Tribunal in *McNaught* was given on an application for permission to appeal and without full submissions. In these circumstances the Tribunal did not consider it bound by the rationale in *McNaught*.
34. The other previous case was *FTS/HPC/PF/17/0285/0286-0287*. It involved the Respondents and the same development as in the current

case. The property involved was 65 Greenrigg Road. In that case the applicants complained of breaches of sections 1A, 3.3, parts of section 4, 6.2 and 6.3 of the Code and breach of property factor's duties. It was decided on 8 February 2018.

35. In that case the first-tier tribunal found that the Respondents had not been appointed as factors in accordance with the Deed of Conditions which governed appointment. Nevertheless the tribunal went on to find that there had been various breaches of the Code and proposed a property factor enforcement order.
36. The issue of the lack of jurisdiction was not focussed in that case and the points raised in the current case were not argued. In these circumstances that case did not assist the current Tribunal.
37. Returning to the current case, Mr Collier submitted that despite the lack of appointment the Tribunal still had jurisdiction to make a determination of whether the Code had been complied with. In short he wished the Tribunal to declare that the Respondents were not property factors for the owners of the development but at the same time to determine that the Respondents had failed to comply with the Code and other property factor's duties owed to the Applicant.
38. The Tribunal found Mr Collier's submission inconsistent. On this branch of the submissions in the present case the Tribunal concluded that if it was established that the Respondents had not been validly appointed as factors for the Properties it would have no jurisdiction to consider the breaches of the Code and property factor's duties alleged in the application under section 17(1)(a) or (b) of the 2011 Act.

Factoring Contract/Appointment of Respondents for Properties

39. The Tribunal considered whether the Respondents had been validly appointed as factors for the Properties. It was accepted that there had been no factor in place at the beginning of 2015. It was also accepted that there was no residents' association in operation for the development.
40. The development consisted of more than one tenement. In that situation the default rules for the appointment of a factor were as set out in section 28 of the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 (2003 Act, s.31A). Section 28(1) provided that subject to certain other sections (which did not apply in the present case) and, importantly, any provision made in community burdens, the owners of a majority of the units in a community could:
- (a) appoint a person to be the "manager" of the community on such terms as they may specify;
 - (b) confer on such manager the right to exercise such of the owners' powers as they may specify (including maintenance powers);
 - (c) revoke or alter the manager's rights to exercise those powers; or
 - (d) dismiss the manager.
41. In the present case, however, there was a community burden which overrode the default rules. It was in the Deed of Conditions recorded in the General Register of Sasines on 2 July 1986. The development and community covered by the 1986 Deed of Conditions was the 75 dwellinghouses numbered 1 to 135 Greenrigg Road within 8 tenements (blocks 1 to 8). The Deed of Conditions provided :
- "6. . . . (1) there will be appointed a Factor who will be responsible for supervising the common repairs to and maintenance of the Property, the Curtilage and the Common Parts and apportioning the cost thereof amongst the proprietors in accordance with this Clause."
- "9.(1) On completion and sale of the last flatted Dwellinghouse the appointed Factor shall arrange the setting up of a Residents

Association whereby the proprietor of each Dwellinghouse shall become a member of such an Association and the proprietor shall have only one vote in deciding matters of common interest to the entire block of flatted Dwellinghouses; such a Residents Association shall have no power in deciding the maintenance and upkeep of the property without a majority consent from the proprietors of the seventy five Dwellinghouses known as numbers 1 – 135 Greenrigg Road, Cumbernauld.

9.(2) Subject as aftermentioned the Residents Association may convene a general meeting of residents at not less than seven days notice with a quorum no less than seven proprietors shall have power (i) to appoint a Factor . . .”

“9(4) The proprietors of any seven of the seventy five Dwellinghouses shall have the power to call a meeting of the Residents Association to be held at such reasonably convenient time and place as the conveners of the meeting may determine and which time and place of meeting at least seven days’ notice in writing shall be given . . . to the other proprietors. . . DECLARING THAT . . . all resolutions of the Residents Association will be passed by a majority of the votes cast and the resolution so passed will be binding upon all proprietors whether assenting or not.”.

The question was whether the Respondents had been appointed in accordance with these provisions.

42. The Tribunal heard evidence from Miss Leeann Semple, owner and occupier of 101 Greenrigg Road. She said that she had never attended any meeting with the Respondents. She had never seen any document calling a meeting prior to the Respondents claiming that they had been appointed. She said that she had not signed anything agreeing to the Respondents’ appointment. She had not received any letter from the residents’ association proposing the Respondents as factors. She had found out about the Respondents initially from a letter from North Lanarkshire Council. She had not received any letter of introduction from the Respondents or letter from the Respondents proposing their

appointment. The first communication from the Respondents had been a bill, perhaps dealing with insurance.

43. Miss Semple spoke to there having been a meeting of residents of the development and neighbouring developments of Greenrigg Road and Millcroft. She confirmed the accuracy of the minutes of the meeting which had taken place at Carbrain Baptist Church (production 10). That had been about a year after the Respondents had initially claimed appointment although she could not be sure of the date. She had received a copy of the minutes from Angie Inch. She noted that she was one of the persons who had agreed to provide assistance on the way forward.
44. Under cross-examination she was presented with a mandate dated 24 August 2015 with her signature "confirming acceptance" of the Respondents as a factor. She accepted that the writing and signature was hers although she had no recollection of signing it. She said that she was unable to remember whether she had signed it before or after she had received the first bill from the Respondents. She had been going through a difficult time in 2015 with a 4 year old disabled child.
45. The Tribunal heard evidence from Shabir Ahmed, owner of 27 Greenrigg Road. He said that the first he was aware of the Respondents was in 2015 when he received a letter stating that a payment was overdue. He had never been invited to any meeting to appoint the Respondents. He had never received anything suggesting that the Respondents should be appointed as factors. He did not recall receiving any document asking him to confirm the Respondents as factors. Nor had he received any letter from other owners stating the the Respondents had been appointed factors. The first he was aware of the Respondents was their claim for an overdue bill of £ 10 to £ 15.

46. Mr Ahmed said that he had contacted the Respondents to find out what was happening. He had asked them for evidence of their appointment many times but had never received any evidence. His request had been made over the telephone and face to face with their Mr Cowan. Each request had been refused apparently on grounds of data protection. He had received the same response by letter.
47. He confirmed that he had never attended any meeting where the Respondents had been confirmed as factors, nor was he aware of any such meeting having taken place.
48. There was no cross-examination of Mr Ahmed on the issue of appointment. The Tribunal accepted Mr Ahmed's evidence as credible and reliable.
49. The Tribunal found Miss Semple's evidence not reliable on some aspects. Although she appeared to be doing her best to recall the initial contacts with the Respondents, it was clear that her memory was hazy on exactly what she had received and what she had signed. While she said that she had not signed anything agreeing to the Respondents, under cross-examination she accepted that she had signed the confirmatory document. In addition her oral evidence to the tribunal did not fit with her written statement where she stated that she had received an introductory letter from the Respondents.
50. However the Tribunal was prepared to accept that Miss Semple had not seen any document calling a meeting prior to the Respondents claiming that they had been appointed, nor received any letter from the residents' association proposing the Respondents as factors. This corresponded with Mr Ahmed's evidence the written statement of Maqsood Mustafa to

the Tribunal (production 1a) and the e-mail from the Applicant (before his death) to his representative dated 31 July 2018 (production 1i)

51. For the Applicant, Mr Collier submitted that while the Residents' Association was inactive, given that the owners of each of the 75 units was by virtue of ownership a member of the Association there was nothing to prevent the owners of 7 units calling a general meeting at which a factor could be appointed. However this had not happened. Absent such appointment the Respondents had not been validly appointed as factors. The signature of some mandates by some homeowners was insufficient to allow the Respondents to be appointed factors for the whole community.

52. For the Respondents, Mr Cowan submitted that the Residents' Association did not exist when they had begun to act as factors for the Properties. He submitted that the Respondents had been approached by several homeowners with a request to become factors. He was unable to provide any evidence of this, however. He then submitted that the Respondents had written to all owners in Greenrigg Road asking if they would consider appointing the Respondents as factors. The letter (production 5b) dated 3 August 2015 was the letter that they had sent. He submitted that the Respondents had been appointed "close by close". If a close had 8 properties its proportion of the whole community was over 10% and it was therefore entitled to appoint its own factor. He accepted that there had not been any general meeting of residents of the community of 75 properties that had appointed the Respondents. He accepted that nothing in the deed of conditions allowed the Respondents to be appointed. Furthermore the Respondents were not relying on the procedures in the Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004 (the other basis of appointment given in the Written Statement of Services).

53. The Tribunal accepted Mr Collier's submission in relation to the validity of the Respondents' appointment. There had been no residents' meeting either called or taken place at which the Respondents had been appointed. Indeed this was accepted by the Respondents. The Respondents' approach to assessing whether they had been appointed or not was fundamentally flawed. Each of the owners in the 75 unit community had bought their properties on the basis that they were part of a 75 unit community that could appoint a factor on their behalf in accordance with the provisions in the Deed of Conditions clauses 6, 9(1), 9(2) and 9(4). There was no legal basis for the owners to appoint a factor "close by close" or "tenement by tenement". That was excluded by the Deed of Conditions which treated 8 tenements as one community of properties. The appointment procedure in the Deed of Conditions had not been followed. That being the case no factoring contract had been created between the Respondents and the homeowners of the community in the 8 blocks covering 1 to 135 Greenrigg Road, Cumbernauld.
54. The Tribunal was surprised that the Respondents were claiming any basis for a valid appointment. A straightforward reading of the deed of conditions (which was publicly available) would have made it clear that (1) the community in question was 75 units; (2) under clause 9(4) any 7 owners could call a meeting of the residents' association (even if it was inoperative); (3) under clause 9(2) a meeting with a quorum of 7 was required to appoint the factor. Even if the Respondents had believed (erroneously) that the Residents Association could not be revived, then it was clear from the Deed of Conditions that the community comprised 75 units and under section 28 of the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 their appointment as factors required a majority of the owners of units in the community, something which they have never claimed to have obtained. The Tribunal deprecated the Respondents' "parachuting" of

themselves onto the development as factors accompanied by the unwarranted sending of invoices to unsuspecting homeowners.

55. Given that the Tribunal found that they had lacked jurisdiction to consider the application they did not require to consider the alleged breaches. Nevertheless, given the detailed submissions and evidence that had been put to it, the Tribunal considered each alleged breach.

Section 1 of the Code

56. Section 1.1a A (a) of the Code provides,

“You must provide each homeowner with a written statement setting out, in a simple and transparent way, the terms and service delivery standards of the arrangement in place between you and the homeowner. . . You must provide the written statement to any new homeowners within four weeks of agreeing to provide services to them . . . The written statement should set out . . . a statement of the basis of any authority you have to act on behalf of all the homeowners in the group.”

57. Mr Collier submitted that the Respondents’ written statement had not set out any basis of authority at all. All it said was they had been appointed, “in accordance with the provisions of the ‘Title Deeds’ for the Development or The Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004 as appropriate.”

Furthermore, it had not been given within 4 weeks of any agreement of the Respondents to act. He led Miss Semple and Mr Ahmed as witnesses. Mr Cowan submitted that the written statement had been given in August 2015. However he could produce no evidence in support of this. He did not put himself forward as a witness.

58. Miss Semple spoke to having received the undated written statement “Property Factoring Statement of Services” (enclosed with the Respondents’ letter to Mr Collier dated 27 July 2018) (“the WSS”) from the Respondents only after having received their “five thousand pound

bill". She said that it had been after 1 September 2016 when according to her statement of account from the Respondents (production 13i) she had received two invoices totalling £ 4850. Under cross-examination she said that it was possible that she might have received the WSS in 2015 when she signed the mandate received from the Respondents as "so much was going on" at that time.

59. Mr Ahmed said that he was unable to say the exact date when he had received the WSS but that it was after he had met Mr Cowan and received the outstanding bill. He had asked Mr Cowan if anyone else had agreed to the Respondents to which Mr Cowan had replied "yes". On hearing this Mr Ahmed confirmed that he had paid £ 100 to the Respondents. He thought that he would probably have received the WSS around 21 October 2015 which is stated to be the date of payment in the Respondents Statement of Account of Mr Ahmed with them (production 13h). The meeting had been before that date. There was no cross-examination of Mr Ahmed.
60. The Tribunal accepted Mr Ahmed's evidence which was given without hesitation or qualification. While Miss Semple said that it was possible that she had received the WSS in 2015, her evidence is supported by that of Aidan Henderson, owner of a property in the neighbouring development who stated in writing (production 1j) that he had received the WSS on or about 1 September 2016. Given that it is accepted that the Respondents treated both developments as one, and Mr Ahmed's receipt of the WSS followed his individual meeting with the Respondents, on a balance of probabilities the Tribunal accepted the evidence of Ms Semple and Mr Henderson as to the date when the WSS was sent to owners in both developments as a whole.

61. With regard to the date when the Respondents first provided services (even if unauthorised), the Tribunal took note of the dates of the Respondents' demands for payment to various homeowners. Thus Mr Ahmed's Statement of Account indicated the invoicing of him for £ 100 at the end of July 2015. The Respondents' list of work (production 5h) states that they cut grass and picked litter for the first time on 12 August 2015. Their "POLITE REMINDER" letter to Yvonne Rivera seeking payment of £ 100 is dated 24 August 2015 (production 7d) which is the same date as the mandate signed by Ms Semple.

62. The Tribunal found that the WSS failed to comply with section 1 of the Code in three respects. Firstly it had been provided no earlier than September 2016 which was more than 4 weeks after the Respondents had, on their own initiative, started to provide services. Secondly, it had failed to give a transparent statement of their actual authority to act to homeowners. To merely state that the appointment is in accordance with the provisions of unspecified title deeds was too vague. It was not transparent. How was the homeowner meant to know which title deed ? It was not for the homeowner to be searching for the deed to justify the factor's authority. It was for the factor to be clear about the basis of their authority and to justify it. This vagueness was compounded by the reference to the Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004 as an alternative means of appointment, again without any reference to the actual process under that Act, such as the date of appointment. A factor is reasonably expected to know the basis of appointment. If a factor is unable to give these details, the factor should question whether it should be acting at all for the properties in question or seek to put the matter beyond doubt by following the proper process. Thirdly, the Respondents had lacked any authority at all for the reasons given in relation to lack of jurisdiction.

Section 2.1 of the Code

63. Section 2.1 of the Code provides that a factor must not provide information which is misleading or false.
64. Mr Collier submitted that the statements in the WSS (a) as to the authority to act; and (b) that invoices would be sent monthly were misleading or false. Mr Cowan denied that was so. The Tribunal found that the statement in the WSS as to the authority to act was false and misleading. In their submissions to the Tribunal the Respondents accepted that their authority was not to be found in the 2004 Act. They claimed that their authority to act was under the deed of conditions while stating that they were appointed “close by close”. If the Respondents had read the deed of conditions it would have been plain that appointment was not done on a “close by close” basis and that a general meeting of the residents of the 75 unit community was required. On any view there was no justification for a “close by close” appointment if they were relying on the deed of conditions. The Tribunal found that the statement in the WSS as to invoices was a statement of future intent. It was not false and misleading in itself.
65. Mr Collier also submitted that the Respondents’ invoices produced as numbers 14a, 14n, 14o, and 14p contained false statements. Invoices 14a and 14o related to the current development. These invoices were :
- No. 38063 dated 3 September 2018 for “Management Fee – Aug 2018” for £ 10.15 plus VAT for proportion “1/1”
 - No. 4932 dated 28 September 2017 for “Management Fee – Aug 2017” for £ 10.00 plus VAT for proportion “1/122”; for “Cleaning – Aug 2017” for proportion 1/122; for “Landscape/L pick – Aug 2017” for proportion 1/122

66. Mr Collier led Mr Ahmed as a witness to the alleged falsity of invoice No. 4932 which was addressed to EML Properties, another owner of a unit in the current development. Mr Ahmed said that as far as he was aware the Respondents had not carried out any work since 2015. For example while the Respondents had claimed to have removed rubbish, this had in fact been done by North Lanarkshire Council. He referred to various photographs which he had taken and had been produced by Mr Collier to the Tribunal.
67. Photographs 2a to 2e were of the communal car park opposite block 1 (numbers 1 to 20 Greenrigg Road). They showed a pile of discarded household items on the car parking space in the same place on 28 August, 29 August, 30 August and 3 and 8 September 2017. Mr Ahmed told the Tribunal that nothing had been done to remove this rubbish.
68. Photographs 2f to 2k were of the southern verge of the vehicle entry branch of Greenrigg Road. They showed discarded household items on the verge in the same place on 14 August to 8 September 2017.
69. Photographs 2l and 2m were of a plant bed near the garages facing the block with numbers 21 to 35 Greenrigg Road. They showed food container waste in the bed on 22 August and 28 August 2017.
70. Photographs 2x to 2bb were of the outside stairway leading to numbers 21 to 35 Greenrigg Road. They showed the same item of litter and soil and dust piled up on the concrete steps next to the side wall with weeds growing all on 11, 28 and 29 August and 3 and 10 September 2017.
71. Photographs 2aaa to 2ccc were of another outside stairway leading to numbers 21 to 35 Greenrigg Road. They showed the same soil and dust

piled up on the concrete steps next to the side wall on 23, 28 and 29 August 2017.

72. Photographs 2xx and 2yy were of the outside stairway leading to walkway adjacent to numbers 21 to 35 Greenrigg Road. They showed the same black hair ball on the steps on 12 July and 13 August 2017.
73. Photographs 2cc to 2kk were of a landing on the internal stairwell above Mr Ahmed's flat which is 27 Greenrigg Road. They showed the same discarded elastic band with dust on 12, 20, 22, 28, 29 and 30 August and 2, 3 and 10 September 2017.
74. Photographs 2ll to 2qq were of the common internal stairwell of Mr Ahmed's block which is 21 to 35 Greenrigg Road. They showed the same discarded pieces of paper on 12, 28, 29 and 30 August and 3 and 10 September 2017.
75. Photographs 2ss to 2ww were of a landing the common internal stairwell of Mr Ahmed's block which is 21 to 35 Greenrigg Road. They showed the same white marking on 12, 22, 28, and 29 August and 10 September 2017.
76. Mr Ahmed confirmed that the invoices in his Statement of Account for £ 51.08 in August and September 2017 included items for cleaning, landscaping and litter picking. Under cross-examination he reiterated that the invoices that he had received from the Respondents did not bear a resemblance to the reality regarding cleaning and litter picking. That evidence was further supported by the invoice at production 14o to EML Properties which contained items for cleaning and litter picking for August 2017. The Tribunal accepted Mr Ahmed's evidence as contained in his photographs with their annotations and also in relation to the invoices he had received. There was no evidence to the contrary.

77. The Tribunal found that the invoices issued to homeowners by the Respondents dated 28 September 2017 did contain false or misleading statements in seeking to charge for cleaning and litter picking in August 2017 when this had not been done. Section 2.1 of the Code had not been complied with.

Section 2.2 of the Code

78. Section 2.2 of the Code provides,
 “You must not communicate with homeowners in any way which is abusive or intimidating, or which threatens them (apart from reasonable indication that you may take legal action).”.
79. The Applicant’s complaint was that he had felt threatened and intimidated by correspondence sent to him by the Respondents. This was :
- Letters to EML Properties (Scot) Ltd (productions 7g and 7i) requesting payment of £ 394.12 stating :
 “As advised failure to pay for works may result in the withdrawal of landlord registration by the local authority and legal action. If payment is not received within 7 days then we will have no option but to notify the local authority of your indebtedness, as you will no longer be deemed a “fit and proper person” and Apex will commence legal proceeding.”
 - Letter to EML Properties (Scot) Ltd (productions 7j and 7m) requesting payment of £ 208.50 stating :
 “Please note failure to contact us or make payment will result in late payment charges being added to your account.”.
80. Mr Collier submitted that the correspondence set out above was threatening and intimidating to the Applicant who had received it. It went far beyond a reasonable indication of legal action. At the second hearing Mr Collier founded also on :

- Circular letter to all homeowners dated 25 October 2017 (production 5q) stating :

“ . . . there appears to be a malicious minority who have their own agenda, which is not for the benefit of the majority of the Owners. You may have received correspondence from “Greenrigg and Millcroft Resident’s Association”; we would comment as follows: -
. . . 3. All correspondence received by us is completely anonymous; if you are aware of the identity of any of the participants we would appreciate this information, to enable us to instigate legal proceedings against them, to protect your position.
4. We have had a meeting with North Lanarkshire Council who indicated that the interference of this group could hinder any progress towards possible grant funding.”

81. The Respondents’ Mr Cowan submitted that there was nothing threatening or intimidating in the letters to EML. It was proper for the Respondents to notify the Landlord Registration authority. With regard to the late payment charges these were indicated in the WSS. There was no threat or intimidation in them. None of the communications had been intended as threats.
82. Section 2.2 is concerned with communications by factors to homeowners. Was any of these communications in any way intimidating or threatening (apart from a reasonable indication of legal action) ? This had to be assessed objectively by reference to a homeowner reacting reasonably upon receipt of the communication but also taking account of the personal sensitivities of the homeowner if these were known to the factor at the time of communication.
83. The Tribunal took the view that the following aspects of the above correspondence were threatening and intimidating and did not constitute a reasonable indication of legal action:

- (a) Threat of reporting to the Landlord Registration unit of the local authority;
- (b) Description in a circular letter to all homeowners of a group homeowners seeking to revive the Residents' Association as a "malicious minority" and seeking information as to their identity to raise (unspecified) legal proceedings against them – this general threat designed to pressurize one group of homeowners by setting the others into conflict against them was clearly threatening and intimidatory to those seeking to revive the Association. The Tribunal found this letter quite outrageous and tended to show that the Respondents were not fit and proper to be property factors.

84. In these respects the Tribunal found that the Respondents had communicated with EML in a way contrary to section 2.2 of the Code.

Section 2.4 of the Code

85. The Applicant complained that the Respondents had breached their duty under section 2.4 of the Code which provides, among other things, "you must have a procedure to consult with the group of homeowners and seek their written approval before providing work or services which will incur charges or fees in addition to those relating to the core service.

Exceptions to this are where you can show that you have agreed a level of delegated authority with the group of homeowners to incur costs up to an agreed threshold or to act without seeking further approval in certain situations (such as in emergencies)"

86. Mr Collier submitted that the Respondents did not have such a procedure. They had not consulted prior to replacing the door entry at a cost per homeowner of £ 1197.81 plus VAT (productions 14h and 14i) or the repair to lights of £ 510.02 inclusive of VAT (production 14j). Nor had there been there any consultation with homeowners before obtaining the quotations all

dated 25 October 2016, for works from “Real Building Contractors” with total costs of £17745 plus VAT for grey paving slabs, £ 1500 plus VAT for replacement of doors to bins stores and securing of all doors; and £ 13500 plus VAT for removal of waste chute doors (productions 9a, 9b, 9c). Mr Collier doubted whether the VAT in the “Real Building Contractors” quotations would be payable in any event given that the the VAT registration number at the foot of the quotations lacked the necessary number of digits (production print-out from European Commission website).

87. Ms Semple gave evidence that she had not been contacted by the Respondents in relation to these items of expenditure before they were incurred. Mr Ahmed gave evidence that there had been no consultation with or agreement by homeowners. He had received the three “Real Building Contractors” quotations without any covering letter. There was no cross-examination on this and the Tribunal accepted this evidence.
88. Mr Cowan submitted that repair work such as that charged for or quoted for was not in the Respondents’ core services. Therefore they required funds for such works. The work in the “Real Building Contractors” quotations had not been carried out. Mr Cowan did not point to any prior consultation procedure by the Respondents or any written approval having been obtained from homeowners.
89. The first question was whether the Respondents had a procedure to consult with homeowners in the 75 unit community. The removal of the waste chute doors was more than a repair. Thus it would have been outwith the core services and required consultation. Yet a quotation had been obtained without any prior consultation. Furthermore the invoice to Ms Rivera dated 1 September 2016 (production 14i), taken with Mr Cowan’s submission that the work had not been carried out suggested that no consultation procedure had been in place, whether or not

activated by the Respondents. They had simply asked homeowners to pay in advance before even obtaining a formal quotation. There was therefore a clear non-compliance with section 2.4 of the Code in that respect.

90. The second question was whether other items of work (for which there had been no consultation or seeking of written approval from homeowners) involved work beyond the core service. Contrary to what Mr Cowan submitted, arranging common repairs was stated as a core service in the Respondents' WSS. In contrast, "improvements and adaptations" were not within the core services.
91. The Tribunal accepted Mr Cowan's submission that the work in the three quotations had not been carried out. Mr Collier did not claim that the work had been carried out. So far as the door entry and light repair work was concerned, it had not been established whether it was an "adaptation or improvement" rather than a "repair". In those circumstances it had not been established that written approval was required before the work was carried out. The Tribunal found no non-compliance with section 2.4 in that respect.

Section 3.3 of the Code

92. Section 3.3 of the Property Factor Code of Conduct provides,
"You must provide . . . in writing at least once a year (whether as part of billing arrangements or otherwise). . . a detailed financial breakdown of charges made and a description of the activities and works carried out which are charged for. In response to reasonable requests, you must also supply supporting documentation and invoices or other appropriate documentation for inspection or copying. You may impose a reasonable charge for copying subject to notifying the homeowner of this charge in advance."

Mr Collier submitted that no breakdown of charges had been provided at all since the alleged appointment in 2015. The irregular issue of invoices did not amount to compliance with section 3.3. A homeowner had no overview of what the factor was doing and charging for over a fixed period of time. As an example the invoice to Mr Mustafa dated 3 September 2018 (production 14a) did not mention any cleaning even though cleaning works of the common areas such as stairwells was part of the core services. The invoice to EML dated 1 September 2016 (production 14h) was the first invoice issued by the Respondents despite them having begun acting in August 2015. Furthermore it did not mention when the works charged for had taken place. Some of the charges on that invoice had in fact been withdrawn by the Respondents.

93. Mr Cowan submitted that the delay in issue had been caused by the Respondents' principal Mrs Bakhshae-Davidson having suffered a serious spinal injury together with computer software problem. He submitted that the invoices sufficed to comply with section 3.3.
94. The Tribunal found that the invoices issued to homeowners failed to contain a detailed financial breakdown of charges. It was quite unclear how the figures in the invoices were reached. The fraction of overall cost being charged to a homeowner was unclear. The dates of the work charged for were not stated. The location of the works within a total of 8 blocks was not stated. The Respondents left homeowners in the dark as to an overview of all charges over a certain period. Transparency was lacking. In these circumstances the Tribunal found non-compliance with section 3.3.

Section 4.9 of the Code

95. Section 4.9 of the Code provides,
 "When contacting debtors, you or any third party acting on your behalf, must not act in an intimidating manner or threaten them

(apart from reasonable indication that you may take legal action). Nor must you knowingly or carelessly misrepresent your authority and/or the correct legal position.”

96. Mr Collier submitted that this had been breached for the same reasons as section 2.2. Mr Cowan opposed this submission on the same basis as for section 2.2. The Tribunal found that it had not been established that the homeowners who had been threatened in the way found for section 2.2 were debtors of the Respondents. It therefore found that for that reason there was no non-compliance with section 4.9.

Section 6.3 of the Code

97. Section 6.3 provides,
- “On request you must be able to show how and why you appointed contractors, including cases where you decided not to carry out a competitive tendering exercise or use in-house staff.”
98. Mr Collier founded on requests made by Mr John Connor in his letters to the Respondents dated 4 November and 15 December both 2016 and an undated letter (productions 6a to 6c). He did not found on any requests by the Applicant. In those circumstances the Tribunal did not need to consider this section of the Code further.

Section 6.4 of the Code

99. Section 6.4 of the Code provides,
- “If the core service agreed with homeowners includes periodic property inspections and/or a planned programme of cyclical maintenance, then you must prepare a programme of works.”
100. Mr Collier accepted that he had no evidence in support of this. In these circumstances the Tribunal found that there had been no non-compliance.

Section 7.1 of the Code

101. Section 7.1 of the Code provides,

“You must have a clear written complaints resolution procedure which sets out a series of steps, with reasonable timescales linking to those set out in the written statement, which you will follow. This procedure must include how you will handle complaints against contractors.”

102. Mr Collier founded on the requests made by Mr John Connor in his letters to the Respondents dated 4 November and 15 December both 2016 and an undated letter (productions 6a to 6c). These were not from the Applicant and the Tribunal did not need to consider these further.

Property Factor’s Duties

103. Mr Collier submitted that the Respondents had failed to carry out :

- (a) Grass cutting,
- (b) Cleaning of internal hallways and stairs;
- (c) General repairs to stairs, hallways and roof.

He relied on the evidence of Mr Ahmed presented in relation to section 2.1 of the Code. This had amounted to a failure to carry out the core services in the WSS which included “cyclical maintenance to communal areas of the Development” and “preserving the amenity of common or shared areas . . . by means of instructing regular gardening, cleaning works, repair and maintenance of common areas.”.

104. Mr Cowan submitted that the Respondents’ operatives went onto the development every two weeks. The Tribunal found that its findings regarding the non-performance of cleaning and maintenance in August and September 2017 would also have established a breach of property factor’s duties had the Respondents been appointed as factors.

Expenses

105. At the end of the hearing Mr Collier requested the Tribunal to make an award of expenses in respect of the cost of him requiring to attend at the second day of the hearing. He submitted that this had been caused by

the unreasonable behaviour of the Respondents at the first day when they requested time to make an oral response in connection with the alleged breaches of sections 3.3, 4.9, 6.3, 6.4 and 7.1 of the Code. He estimated the wasted cost at the rate of £ 7.83 per hour to cover the hearing on the second day (2 ¼ hours) plus the duration of travel from the Tribunals Centre to Rutherglen which was 50 minutes.

106. The Tribunal did not find that the request by the Respondents to make an oral response to the alleged breaches of the sections of Code was unreasonable behaviour. Whilst at the end of the first day Mr Collier had indicated that he did not wish to add to his written submissions on those sections of the Code that did not mean that it was unreasonable behaviour for the Respondents to wish to add or even consider adding oral representations to their written submissions on those sections at a continued hearing. The Tribunal refused the request for an order for payment of expenses.

Opportunity for Review, Representations and Rights of Appeal

107. Any Applicant or the Respondents may seek a review of and make representations to the First-tier Tribunal on this decision. Any request for a review or the making of such representations must be made in writing to the Tribunal by no later than 14 days after the day when this decision was sent to the parties. It must state why a review is necessary.
108. The opportunity to make representations and to seek a review is not an opportunity to present fresh evidence, such as additional documents. Bearing in mind that the parties have already had an oral hearing, should the parties wish a further oral hearing they should include with their request for a review and written representations a request for such a hearing giving specific reasons as to why written representations would be inadequate.

109. **In the meantime and in any event, the Applicant or the Respondents may seek permission to appeal on a point of law against this decision to the Upper Tribunal by means of an application to the First-tier Tribunal made within 30 days beginning with the date when this decision was sent to the party seeking permission.**

110. **All rights of appeal are under section 46 of the Tribunals (Scotland) Act 2014 and the Scottish Tribunals (Time Limits) Regulations 2016. The seeking of a review and the making of representations does not suspend or otherwise affect this time limit.**

D Bartos

Signed ..

..Legal Member and Chairperson

.....8 April 2019.....Date